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I. Introduction
One of the fundamental principles of American Revolution was the idea that
legitimate sovereignty lay not with the government, but with the people. 1 Under English
law, Blackstone recognized the “sovereign” to be the British parliament, which he
defined as the House of Commons, the House of Lords, and the King acting together. 2
After the Revolution, the term “sovereign” could no longer mean what it meant under
English law. Instead, Americans embraced the idea that the people themselves were the
legitimate source of power, and were therefore the sovereign. 3
This philosophical shift could arguably have implications for the validity of
“sovereign immunity,” the immunity from suit enjoyed by the sovereign. At the most
basic level, it would seem improper for a government to invoke sovereignty as the basis
for immunity from suit if the government were not, in fact, the sovereign. The issue also
has deeper problems beyond the semantic propriety of using the term “sovereign.” If,
under the American political regime, the people are the legitimate source of ultimate
power, then perhaps it is improper for a government to shield itself from compensating
individuals for the harms it causes them. On the other hand, even though the people may

1

As announced in the Declaration of Independence,
That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed, — That whenever any Form of Government becomes
destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new
Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to
them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2
SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 17 (American Students’
Edition, 3d ed. 1894) (facsimile ed).
3
See, e.g., James Wilson, Of the Law of Nations, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 153 (Robert Green
McCloskey ed., 1967).
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be sovereign, they clearly vest their government with certain powers, and the successful
exercise of those powers might require that the government receive certain protections
and be treated, at least in some circumstances, like a “sovereign” entity. In particular, in
dealings between governments, American governments (both state and federal) should
not receive worse treatment because they are not “sovereign.” As will be argued in this
paper, these intergovernmental considerations have federalism implications such that it
may be more appropriate, in federal-state interactions, to consider states as “sovereigns.”
In this paper, I attempt to examine the extent to which the notion of popular
sovereignty has affected America’s views on sovereign immunity. This paper does not
attempt to settle the ongoing battles about whether the Constitution protects sovereign
immunity, although those battles are examined in part because they have produced the
most thorough critiques and defenses of sovereign immunity. I examine the debates
surrounding the ratification of the U.S. Constitution and Chisholm v. Georgia because
those events present insights into how the framers saw the issues of sovereignty and
sovereign immunity. Since one framer, James Wilson, had unusually well-developed and
pointed views on the topic, his views are examined in detail. I also examine the
reasoning of late-20th century state judicial opinions abolishing common law sovereign
immunity.
Constitutional and common law sovereign immunity meet very different fates,
and I will argue that constitutional sovereign immunity has fewer conflicts with the idea
of popular sovereignty. This is because the federalist rationale behind constitutional
sovereignty, which is absent from common law sovereign immunity, makes the
“sovereignty” being protected by the Constitution more akin to protection from
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interference by another government, instead of protection from suit from citizens.
Finally, practical fiscal considerations have always played a significant role in the
sovereign immunity debate, and I conclude with a brief exploration of whether such
considerations, when carried out by the judiciary, are consistent with popular sovereignty.

II. Background
A. Sovereign Immunity - Definitions
In its simplest terms, sovereign immunity is the immunity from suit enjoyed by
government entities. That straightforward concept has its roots in the Constitution, the
common law, and statutes, and it is subject to numerous exceptions and caveats. The
doctrine’s contours are too numerous to outline in detail, but in general it bars suits for
monetary damages against state and federal governments, unless a statute says otherwise.
The doctrine does not apply to suits for injunctive relief brought against state officers. 4
Additionally, special rules of immunity apply to suits for monetary damages against state
officers (as opposed to suits against states themselves). 5 In contrast to state and federal
governments, local governments enjoy no constitutional immunity from suit6 (although
they may enjoy statutory immunity in certain jurisdictions). Government bodies entitled
to sovereign immunity may waive their own immunity, 7 and in certain circumstances

4

See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
For example, officers enjoy “qualified immunity” from suit if their conduct did not amount to a violation
of clearly established law of which a reasonable person should have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
6
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 2.11, at 52 (7th ed. 2004). However,
state laws sometimes limit the types of suits that can be brought against governments.
7
Id. at 56.
5
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federal law may serve to abrogate the sovereign immunity of states without their
consent. 8
One primary source of this immunity from suit is the United States Constitution,
which (as currently interpreted) protects the states from suits in both federal and state
court. 9 The Constitution also indirectly protects the federal government from suit by
giving Congress the power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts, thereby
allowing Congress to limit the circumstances under which the federal government can be
sued. 10
The constitutional roots of sovereign immunity have been hotly contested in the
U.S. Supreme Court within the past several decades, and a majority of the Court has held
that the Constitution protects states from most suits arising under federal law. 11 In this
debate, sovereign immunity is portrayed as a federalism issue – states are seeking the
protection of sovereign immunity to avoid answering suits brought under statutes applied
against them by Congress. 12 These suits, the states argue, undermine the sovereignty and
the dignity of the states by forcing them to answer in court like common defendants. 13
Furthermore, forcing states to pay monetary judgments to private parties impermissibly

8

Congress may abrogate the sovereign immunity of states when it acts to prevent the violations of
constitutional rights pursuant to its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). Additionally, states can be subject to certain suits under the U.S.
Constitution. See, e.g., Manning v. Mining & Minerals Div., 2006-NMSC-027, 144 P.3d 87 (allowing suit
against state under the Takings Clause, but disallowing suit under the Contracts Clause).
9
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
10
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”).
11
See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (barring suit based upon cause of action
created by Congress pursuant to its commerce powers).
12
Id.
13
Alden, 527 U.S. at 714-15.
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interferes with the power of states to democratically control their purse strings. 14 These
arguments have proven successful in protecting states from suit. 15
Another major source of sovereign immunity has been the common law. For
much of our country’s history, this doctrine, created and enforced by the courts, has
prevented states and local governments from being sued in tort in state court. In the latter
half of the 20th century, the doctrine came into disfavor with courts. In striking down the
common law doctrine, courts have not been shy about explaining their views on
sovereignty and sovereign immunity.
A third major source of sovereign immunity is statutory. This body of law has
become more important in light of the demise of common law sovereign immunity. An
exploration of the philosophical justification for such statutes in light of America’s vision
of sovereignty would most likely be a rich topic with numerous parallels to an
examination of constitutional and common law sovereign immunity, but such an
exploration is not undertaken in this paper because legislative acts, as opposed to judicial
doctrines, can be more fairly traced to the “people” themselves, since the legislature
theoretically represents the popular will. Thus, statutory immunity has a conceptually
distinct relationship with the notion of popular sovereignty, and it is not analyzed in
depth in this paper.
B. Pre-revolutionary Sovereign Immunity: Practice and Theory
1. Colonial and English Practice
In determining how America’s framers squared sovereign immunity with popular
sovereignty, it is first necessary to outline the common understanding of sovereign

14
15

Id. at 749.
See id.
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immunity in the colonies at the time of the Revolution. Various scholars and courts have
disagreed about the scope of sovereign immunity in the colonies before the ratification of
the Constitution and about the prevailing views of sovereign immunity at that time. On
the one hand, the Supreme Court has recently argued that “[a]lthough the American
people had rejected other aspects of English political theory, the doctrine that a sovereign
could not be sued without its consent was universal in the States when the Constitution
was drafted and ratified.” 16 A number of scholars have attempted to examine prerevolutionary English sovereign immunity. While the sovereign was personally immune
from suit, 17 the English courts allowed for mechanisms by which individuals harmed by
the government could obtain redress through the court system. The first mechanism was
the petition of right, whereby the crown would allow individuals to bring suits against the
government. 18 Although this petition was nominally granted as a matter of grace (as
opposed to obligation), scholars have claimed that by the time of the revolution such
petitions were normally granted. 19 Furthermore, injured individuals could also bring
suits against individual government officers. 20 Scholars have also argued that colonial
charters allowed the colonies to sue and be sued, 21 meaning that the newly independent
state governments would not have been accustomed to the privilege of sovereign
immunity.
Thus, while the doctrine of sovereign immunity was present at the time of the
Revolution, exceptions served to limit its applicability, especially with regard to suits
16

Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715-16 (1999).
Edwin L. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (Part I), 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1924).
18
Id. at 5.
19
Id.
20
Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1
(1963).
21
John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1896 (1983).
17

7

against colonial officers. However, the doctrine was still widely known and recognized
at the time of the Revolution, as demonstrated by its invocation in the ratification debates
and early judicial opinions, and its presence in the writings of the founding generation.
The question remained, however, whether the doctrine would be philosophically
justifiable in America, given the Revolutionary concept that sovereignty resides with the
people.
2. Theory
In seeking to answer whether sovereign immunity and popular sovereignty are
compatible, it is helpful to examine the theoretical underpinnings behind English
sovereign immunity at the time of the Revolution, at least as interpreted by American
observers. Scholars have identified several justifications for sovereign immunity in the
pre-revolutionary era. 22 The first justification was the theory of absolute, divine right,
which was embodied in the maxim “the king can do no wrong.” 23 Since he had divine
authority, it was antithetical that the king would have to compensate individuals for acts
done to them. This justification for sovereign immunity had eroded somewhat by the
time of the Revolution, since the monarch could no longer claim an absolute right to
govern. 24 Nonetheless, the idea remained with Americans that the King had, as a matter
of privilege, the right to dictate the manner in which he would compensate individuals for
harm done to them. 25 For shorthand purposes, this rationale will be termed the
“privilege” rationale in this paper.

22

Edwin L. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort (Part VI), 36 YALE L.J. 1, 17 (1926).
Id.; see also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 34.
24
See Borchard (Part I), supra note 17, at 2.
25
See id.
23
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The second theoretical justification for sovereign immunity was that, as the state
was the source of the laws, it could not be expected to be bound by them. 26 There were
two arguments implicit in this rationale. The first was practical – the enforcement of
laws requires state force. The enforcement of laws against the state itself, however,
would require some other force, and in an ordered state this other force is not present
because the state has (or seeks) a monopoly on organized power. 27 The second was
based in logic. If a state disobeyed a law, nothing would stop the state from simply
changing the law to ensure its own compliance. 28 For shorthand purposes, this set of
rationales will be deemed the “enforcement” rationale (due to its emphasis upon the
logical and practical difficulties of enforcing judgments against governments).
C. Popular Sovereignty – American Style
A strong proponent of the idea of popular sovereignty was James Wilson, a
Pennsylvania attorney, law professor, delegate to the Constitutional Convention, and
United States Supreme Court Justice. Wilson had an abiding belief in the principles of
the Revolution that were rarely tempered by a fear of practical difficulties. If popular
sovereignty was philosophically inconsistent with sovereign immunity, Wilson would not
hesitate to point out the inconsistency.
Wilson’s views on sovereign immunity necessarily derive from his views on
sovereignty and the nature of the republican governments. In a series of lectures
delivered at the University of Pennsylvania between 1790-92, Wilson articulated a theory

26

Borchard (Part VI), supra note 22, at 17.
But see infra, Part IV, for a discussion of how this rationale changes in a federalist system where multiple
governments share power.
28
Of course, states might come under political pressure to be bound by the same laws as non-state actors.
27
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of sovereignty that is echoed elsewhere in Revolutionary-era political thought: 29
legitimate sovereignty, in a republican state, resides in the people, not in the
government. 30 The source of authority among “free people” was the consent of the ruled,
not the will of a superior. 31 Moreover, sovereignty remained with the people even after
they chose their form of government and their leaders.32
Wilson viewed states as artificial persons composed of the citizens of the state. 33
He believed that individuals formed governments to protect their natural rights, 34 chiefly
the right to pursue happiness. 35 Once those individuals joined together, they formed a
“corporation.” 36 A state was but one form of a corporation, 37 and there could be smaller
corporations formed within a state. 38 Corporations, Wilson believed, had moral rights
and duties that were analogous to those for individuals. 39 Natural rights and duties were
placed upon mankind by God, 40 but there was no corporeal authority that legitimately

29

In the Federalist Papers, for example, James Madison argued that the ratification of the Constitution
could be lawfully done upon “[t]he express authority of the people alone.” THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 229
(James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan, eds., 2001).
30
James Wilson, Of the Law of Nations, supra note 3, at 153.
31
James Wilson, Of Municipal Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 192 (Robert Green McCloskey
ed., 1967).
32
James Wilson, Of Government, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 304 (Robert Green McCloskey ed.,
1967).
33
James Wilson, Of Man, As Member of Society, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 239 (Robert Green
McCloskey ed., 1967).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 240.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 239-40.
39
James Wilson, Of the Law of Nations, supra note 3, at 152; James Wilson, Of Man, As Member of
Society, supra note 33, at 239-240.
40
James Wilson, Of the Law of Nations, supra note 3, at 149.
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existed to enforce those duties. 41 Thus, mankind was forced to bind itself, 42 and this selfrule was the only legitimate source of authority. 43

III. Immunity in America – Its History and Justifications
Having outlined the theoretical justifications behind sovereign immunity (at least
as understood by Americans) and one robust version of the American vision of popular
sovereignty, it is now possible to examine how Americans grappled with the interplay
between the two concepts. In this section, I outline how Americans attempted to
reconcile the two concepts (or argue against their possible reconciliation) in two contexts:
the interpretation of the Constitution, and common-law tort lawsuits against states.
A. Immunity as a Constitutional Principle
1. Ratification Debates
Some of the early discussions about the scope of sovereign immunity in the
Americas surrounded Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, which provided for
federal court jurisdiction over cases and controversies “between a State and Citizens of
another State...and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.” 44 Some opponents of the Constitution objected that this language allowed for
individual plaintiffs to hale states into court as defendants. While not one of the central
points of contention during the ratification debates, it did come up in multiple states, and
the debates reveal how some of the founders conceived of the appropriateness of
sovereign immunity in America.
41

James Wilson, Of the General Principles of Law and Obligation, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON
112-113 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967).
42
James Wilson, Of Municipal Law, supra note 31, at 192.
43
Id.
44
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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a. Virginia
In the Virginia ratification debates, Patrick Henry (an opponent of the proposed
Constitution) believed that the plain language of the text allowed for such suits. 45 The
Constitution’s backers, including John Marshall and James Madison, contended that the
provision could not allow for states to be brought to court as defendants because such a
result was contrary to the nature of sovereignty. According to Marshall, it was “not
rational to believe that the sovereign power should be dragged before a court.” 46
Madison flatly asserted that it was “not in the power of individuals to call any state into
court.” 47 Thus, at least in the context of sovereign immunity, Marshall and Madison did
not believe that the assumption of sovereignty by the people themselves would prevent
governments from asserting the right of the sovereign to refuse to answer a complaint in
court. Although their comments do not provide a full explanation of why they believed
“sovereigns” should be immune from suit, the comments appear to invoke the
“enforcement” rationale of sovereign immunity, because they appeal to the difficulties of
logic and power in enforcing the commands of a court upon the government. If their
words are to be taken at face value, they evidently did not see an incompatibility between
popular sovereignty and an “enforcement” based sovereign immunity.
Edmund Randolph saw the weakness in assuming that traditional notions of
sovereignty held up in light of the Revolution and the text of the Constitution. Randolph
asserted that the text would allow for states to be made defendants “whatever the law of
nations may say.” 48 Randolph’s interpretation proved prophetic, as the Supreme Court in

45

Patrick Henry, in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION at 543 (2d ed. 1861).
John Marshall, in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 45, at 555.
47
James Madison, in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 45, at 533.
48
Edmund Randolph, in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 45, at 573 (emphasis added).
46
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Chisholm v. Georgia soon allowed for suits against states based upon the text of Article
III. 49 Only one of the five Justices raised objections to such a construction based upon
traditional notions of sovereignty. 50 Coincidentally, Randolph, as Attorney General,
argued Chisholm on behalf of the federal government, 51 and successfully convinced the
court that the jurisdiction should lie in that case.
b. New York
The written debates over the Constitution in New York also touched upon the
topic of sovereign immunity and whether Article III allowed for suits by individuals
against states. In Federalist No. 81, written to persuade New Yorkers to support the
proposed Constitution, Alexander Hamilton asserted that they were not. In one of the
most extensive defenses of sovereign immunity to be found in the ratification debates,
Hamilton asserted:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to
the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general
sense, and the general practice of mankind; and the exception, as
one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the
government of every state in the union....there is no colour to
pretend that the state governments would, by the adoption of that
[Constitution], be divested of the privilege of paying their own

49

2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
Id. at 429-450 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
51
Id. at 419.
50
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debts in their own way, free from every constraint but that which
flows from the obligations of good faith.52
Hamilton’s defense of sovereign immunity rested on several premises. First, he
assumed that the government was the sovereign, and thus the government would be
entitled to the privileges of sovereignty. Those privileges included the right to not be
bound by any outside power. Second, by relying upon the “general practice of mankind,”
his argument assumed that American governments could borrow notions of governmental
prerogative from other nations. Next, he asserted that the states each enjoyed immunity
from suit. 53 This line of argumentation seems to invoke the “privilege” rationale of
sovereign immunity – instead of focusing on the logical problems inherent in forcing
governments into their own courts, the statement makes reference to the “privilege” of
sovereigns and the fact that it is “shared” by every government in the world.
In an essay opposing the proposed Constitution, the Anti-Federalist author Brutus
evinced a realist view of judicial power-grabbing to argue that the text of Article III
would result in a ruinous avalanche of suits against states for damages. Brutus first
argued that the plain text of the Constitution allowed for suits against states by
individuals of different states. 54 This in itself he found objectionable – he argued it was
“humiliating and degrading” 55 and asserted that no state had ever submitted to the

52

THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 422-23 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey and James McClellan, eds.,
2001).
53
While it may be impossible to prove or disprove this statement, several state constitutions drafted near
the time of the ratification of the Constitution allowed for suits against states subject to legislative approval.
See PENN. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 11; DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 9; TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, §
17.
54
See Brutus, Essays of Brutus No. XIII (Feb. 21, 1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST ¶¶ 2.9.160161, at 429 (Herbert J. Storing, ed., 1981).
55
Id. ¶ 2.9.161, at 429.

14

jurisdiction of its courts in such a manner. 56 He also argued that, in the case of debts
owed by states, the creditors never contemplated being able to bring states into court. 57
Brutus argued that in-state creditors would sell the debt to out-of-state creditors,
effectively subjecting states to judicial authority with regard to all debts. 58 Although he
did not raise the issue with regard to suits against states, Brutus’s critique of diversity
jurisdiction provided another mechanism by which creditors could reach states. Brutus
feared that diversity jurisdiction would be turned into general jurisdiction by way of legal
“fictions” akin to those fictions used by the King’s Bench to enhance its jurisdiction in
medieval England. 59 Federal courts might entertain the fiction that a party lived in a
different state in order to declare that they had jurisdiction to hear the claim. 60
Brutus argued that the costs of forcing the states into court to answer for their
debts would be immense. 61 Since, according to Brutus, states were also hamstrung in
their power to collect revenue under the Constitution,62 the federal judiciary would
“crush the states beneath its weight.” 63 Thus, while many of the proponents of the
Constitution seemed to stay in the realm of the theoretical and the abstract in arguing that
states were not subject to suit from individuals under the Constitution, Brutus was more
open about the practical fears of forcing state governments into the federal court system.
He also engaged the Constitution’s defenders on the theoretical level by using the terms
56

Id.
Id.
58
Id. ¶ 2.9.162, at 429.
59
Brutus, Essays of Brutus No. XII (Feb. 14, 1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST ¶ 2.9.157, at
427 (Herbert J. Storing, ed., 1981). Brutus recounts that the King’s Bench originally only had jurisdiction
over “trespasses and injuries vi et armis. Id. The court could also hear cases in which the defendant was in
the custody of the court. Id. Thus, the court allowed plaintiffs to plead fallacious trespasses, bringing
defendants into the custody of the court, and then the plaintiffs could proceed with other causes of action.
Id.
60
Id.
61
Brutus, supra note 2, ¶¶ 2.9.164, .167, at 430-31 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
62
Id. ¶ 2.9.164, at 430.
63
Id. ¶ 2.9.167, at 431.
57
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“humiliating and degrading,” perhaps suggesting that he considered the states to be
entitled to immunity from suit based upon a “privilege” rationale.
c. Pennsylvania
In Pennsylvania, James Wilson spoke in support of the proposed Constitution and
admitted that Article III allowed for suits against states. If the debates in Virginia and
New York are any indication, the idea that states would be subject to suits by private
individuals was politically unpopular. Indeed, there was good reason for this. States had
large war debts, 64 and forcing them into court to repay these debts might weaken them
significantly. It is safe to assume that the debts were not widely held by the voting
public, so they would not see a significant benefit of allowing for individual suits against
states.
Notwithstanding the political unpopularity of his position, Wilson argued in
Pennsylvania that “[i]mpartiality is the leading feature in this Constitution; it pervades the
whole. When a citizen has a controversy with another state, there ought to be a tribunal
where both parties may stand on a just and equal footing.” 65
In his Lectures on the Law several years afterwards, Wilson elaborated upon the
theme of sovereign immunity. In his lectures, Wilson conceived of states as artificial
“persons” 66 that were under a moral duty to follow natural law, even if there was no
external authority to regulate them. 67 As “moral persons,” they could do wrong and
right. 68 And this meant they could certainly harm individuals unjustly. 69 Wilson thought
64

Jaffe, supra note 20, at 19 (citing the fear of paying war debts as the “prime cause” of the contraction of
the right to sue governments in the United States).
65
James Wilson, in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 45, at 491.
66
Supra Part II.C.
67
Id. at 153-54.
68
Id. at 160.
69
Id.
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it obvious that the just outcome when states mistreated individuals was that the individual
received redress from the state. 70 The lack of an external power to ensure that the state
did what was just was immaterial because individuals in a state of nature were dutybound despite a similar lack of external authority. 71 In other words, the only legitimate
source of authority for humans was self-rule, and thus states and other corporations could
very well rule themselves according to natural law as well. 72 Some of those natural law
duties included keeping promises and obligations and not harming others. 73
Wilson attacked sovereign immunity as a vestige of absolute monarchy that had
no place in the American system of government. He thought it pernicious and
antithetical to American ideals to believe that American officials could “do no wrong.” 74
Since, in America, the people are the sovereign, no government can assert that it is above
the interests of the people. 75 Wilson claimed that notions of superiority and royal
prerogative were being exposed as unsound in Great Britain, 76 but since they were so
ingrained into the British legal regime it might be impossible to fully eliminated them
without damage to the rest of the system. 77 However, since Americans only recognized
those natural precepts of justice imposed upon mankind by God, jurisdiction to hear suits
should no longer imply superiority of any kind. 78

70

James Wilson, Of the Nature of Courts, 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 497 (Robert Green McCloskey
ed., 1967).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
James Wilson, Of Man, As a Member of Society, supra note 33, at 232-33.
74
James Wilson, Comparison of the Constitution of the United States, With That of Great Britain, in 1 THE
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 316-17 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967).
75
Id. at 317.
76
Id. at 316.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 316-17.
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Nor did Wilson give much credence to the argument that states would lose their
dignity if forced to answer suits at the hands of individuals. In the context of foreign
relations, Wilson acknowledged that maintaining the dignity of the state was a legitimate
aim. 79 But in the context of domestic affairs, Wilson believed that the dignity of the state
was no more than the aggregate of the dignity of its citizens. 80 Since the dignity of
individual citizens was not degraded by appearing before a court, Wilson argued that the
dignity of a state should not be so considered either. 81
If mankind was forced to bind itself, then Wilson reasoned that corporations had
to do the same. 82 Thus, it was immaterial to Wilson that no higher external authority
existed to regulate, for example, interactions between nations; 83 nations were bound by
the self-imposed law of nations, which Wilson believed was really natural law as applied
to nations. 84
d. Conclusion
In summary, the founders, in considering whether the Constitution allowed for
suits against states, demonstrated a variety of approaches to the problem of sovereign
immunity. In New York, Alexander Hamilton and Brutus both asserted that states were
entitled to the “privilege” of only being sued subject their own consent. Of the two
philosophical rationales used to defend sovereign immunity, the privilege rationale seems
to be the weaker one. If popular sovereignty is a serious doctrine, it is unclear what
“privilege,” if any, states should be entitled when dealing with the people. In Virginia,
79

James Wilson, Of the Law of Nations, supra note 3, at 157. Wilson believed that promoting the dignity
of a nation was important in order to ensure the proper tenor of conduct between countries. Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
James Wilson, Of the Nature of Courts, supra note 70, at 497.
83
James Wilson, Of the Law of Nations, supra note 3, at 153-54.
84
Id. at 153.
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Madison and Marshall both seemed to raise the problem of enforcement of judgments
against governments. While this seems reasonable from a logical point of view, James
Wilson argued that difficulties in securing enforceable judgments do not relieve
republican governments from their obligations to do justice by the people, since the
people are the sovereign.
2. Chisholm v. Georgia and the Eleventh Amendment
If the issue of sovereign immunity was not the centerpiece of the ratification
debates, Chisholm v. Georgia catapulted the topic to prominence in the American
political arena. 85 The purpose of this paper is not to take sides in the constitutional
debate at issue in Chisholm, but instead to mine the reasoning of the case in order to
examine the interplay between the theoretical justifications for sovereign immunity and
popular sovereignty.
In Chisholm, the nascent Supreme Court was faced with the nettlesome issue of
war debts owed by states. The plaintiff in the case, Alexander Chisholm, was the
executor of the estate of a South Carolina merchant who had sold clothing and blankets to
Georgia. 86 Chisholm claimed that the merchant had never received payment for the
goods, a charge the State of Georgia denied. 87 When the case was brought to the
Supreme Court, Georgia claimed that it was immune from suit. 88 The Supreme Court
thus had to deal with the question of whether Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution
allowed for federal jurisdiction over a suit prosecuted by a citizen against a foreign state.
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Each Supreme Court justice wrote his own opinion in Chisholm, which frustrates legal
researchers seeking to delineate its holding 89 but which also allows readers to discover a
broader array of views with regard to sovereign immunity.
a. Iredell
Justice Iredell cast the lone dissenting vote in the case, although his view
ultimately prevailed with the passage of the Eleventh Amendment 90 and with the
affirmation of his reasoning in Hans v. Louisiana. 91 In denying Chisholm the right to sue
the State of Georgia in federal court, Justice Iredell argued that states are indeed
sovereign, except for that portion of their sovereignty that was delegated under the
Constitution. 92
Iredell sought to settle the case on non-Constitutional grounds. He claimed that
the judiciary had no powers except those granted by Congress – in other words, the
judicial powers under Article III were not self-executing. 93 Thus, he examined whether
the judiciary had the power to hear the case under the Judiciary Act. 94 He construed the
act as limiting the judiciary to exercising “those principles and usages of law already well
known.” 95 He then examined whether suits by individuals against states (or their
analogues) were accepted under the common law. 96 Since the states, in Iredell’s view,
were still sovereign (except with respect to that portion forfeited to the federal
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government), 97 Iredell concluded that the only possible analogue was a suit against the
crown. 98 He examined in some detail various authorities on when individuals could
bring suits for damages against the crown, 99 and although he acknowledged that there
was a petition – the petition of right to the King – and a procedure for such suits,100 he
argued that the need for a petition and the procedural strictures demonstrated that it was
within the King’s discretion to hear the suit,101 and furthermore he doubted the petition’s
vitality in an era of parliamentary supremacy in fiscal matters. 102
Analogizing to suits against states, Iredell assumed that legislative bodies and
their agents could not be sued. 103 Unfortunately for plaintiffs, no other person of state
government had the authority to bind the state because no other person could authorize
expenditures. 104 In other words, no one else had “colour to represent the sovereignty of
the state.” 105 Since individuals had no method to sue the state, all they could do was
request relief from the “discretion and good faith of the Legislative body.” 106
Iredell’s view seems to have been that the common law recognized a suit against
the sovereign when the King was sovereign, although that suit was ultimately allowed
based upon the King’s good graces. However, since sovereignty resides in the
legislature, no suit can be brought against them or their agents. As will be demonstrated
in Part III.B,his view of the common law was accepted by early American state courts in
denying recovery to plaintiffs who sued state governments. Iredell invoked both the
97
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“privilege” and the “enforcement” rationales of sovereign immunity. On the privilege
prong, he was careful to argue that the King had discretion in deciding whether to allow a
Petition of Right. As for the enforcement prong, he concluded that suing the legislature
was a matter of practical impossibility, since in his view no court could force a legislature
to expend funds. Interestingly, Iredell’s decision was devoid of any mention of popular
sovereignty. He simply stated, without elaboration, that the states were sovereign except
to the extent they forfeited their sovereignty to the federal government.
b. Blair
Justice Blair eschewed the passionate defense of popular sovereignty present in
the opinions of Justices Wilson and Jay. Instead, Blair’s opinion did two noteworthy
things. First, he read the plain meaning of the text that allowed for states to be
defendants, concluding that the provision meant what it said. 107 Second, he methodically
picked apart each of the justifications for sovereign immunity. In attacking the privilege
rationale, Blair implicitly rejected traditional notions of sovereignty by refusing to
consider foreign authorities. He deemed “their likeness...not sufficiently close” to
America’s form of government. 108 However, he did decide to demonstrate solicitude
toward the state by declining to issue a default judgment based upon its failure to appear
in the case. 109 Blair also attacked the “enforcement” rationale by stating that it was the
Court’s role to uphold the law as it understood it; if there were enforcement problems, the
court could “leave it to those departments of Government which have higher powers.” 110
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Blair, therefore, while not mentioning popular sovereignty, found both the
rationales justifying sovereign immunity to be insufficient under the American system of
government. He was not completely unmindful of the privilege sought by the state,
however, but he seemed totally unpersuaded by the enforcement rationale, essentially
arguing that any problems should be worked out by another branch of government.
c. Wilson
Wilson’s views on whether the Constitution allowed for suits against states were
probably not in doubt, given that he had already made his views known on that precise
question during the Pennsylvania ratification debates and in his lectures on the law at the
University of Pennsylvania. 111
In his Chisholm opinion, Wilson stayed true to the ideas espoused in his lectures
and at the Pennsylvania ratification debates. He reiterated the idea that states were
nothing more than “artificial persons” made up of assembled individuals, and that they
could be bound by natural duties and obligations in the same manner as individuals. 112
He argued that states were therefore morally bound to meet obligations and to be just in
their dealings with others. 113 Thus, as a matter of justice, Wilson believed that it was the
right thing for states to do to make themselves amenable for redress in court. 114 Wilson
illustrated this point by providing examples of other governments, from Athens to Spain
to Prussia to the Saxon Kings, that were amenable to suit. 115
Wilson’s Chisholm opinion also emphasized the superiority of the people to their
government. He accused the states of hiding behind the term “sovereign” in attempting
111
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to evade their obligations, 116 which he thought misleading since the people were the true
sovereign in America. 117 The very concept of sovereignty, Wilson argued, was derived
from feudal times, when the lord had to establish legitimacy of his rule. 118 Such a
concept had no place in a society founded upon the consent of the people. 119
d. Cushing
Like Justice Blair, Justice Cushing did not look at the experiences of other
countries in determining whether the Constitution allowed for suits against states. 120 For
Cushing, the determining factor was the purpose behind the Constitution and behind
government itself: to protect the rights of individuals. 121 The rights of individuals,
Cushing argued, were therefore more prized than the rights of states. 122 In allowing for
suits against states, Cushing acknowledged that the reasoning might be extended to suits
against the United States, and appeared ready to accept that reading if it were a
“necessary consequence.” 123 However, he was clearly uncomfortable with the idea that
individuals could sue the United States government, and thought that this case did not
settle the question. 124
Cushing’s reasoning that the rights of individuals are the end of government is a
clear indication that he thought popular sovereignty trumped the “privilege” of a state to
refuse to answer a lawsuit. Cushing did not explicitly address the enforcement rationale,

116

Id. at 456.
Id.
118
Id. at 457-58.
119
Id. at 458.
120
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 466 (1793) (Cushing, J.). Justice Cushing did acknowledge
that the inquiry might be “elucidated” by the law or practice of England, but never undertook such a
comparison. Id.
121
Id. at 468.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 469.
124
Id.
117

24

although it obviously did not trouble him enough to require much analysis. However, in
his uneasy feeling about the implications of the holding to suits against the United States,
Cushing indicated that he was not as willing as Wilson to throw the courthouse doors
wide open to suits against governments based solely on the principles of popular
sovereignty.
e. Jay
Like Wilson, Jay challenged the notion that the states really had the right to call
themselves “sovereign” at all. Prior to the Revolution, Jay argued, the people were
subjects of the British Crown; however, the Revolution heralded the passage of
sovereignty to the American people. 125 The people of the United States were the true
sovereigns of the nation, because they were the source of authority. 126 Jay contrasted this
with feudal Europe, where the king was the source of authority. 127
Additionally, Jay argued, it was legal to sue a corporation that operated under a
charter, if the corporation had caused harm. 128 Suing a corporation, in his view, was akin
to suing the individuals comprising it. 129 Jay pointed out that the City of Philadelphia
was nothing more than a corporation operating under a charter, and that it was susceptible
to suit. 130 Jay found no reason why an incorporated city should be susceptible to suit but
a state, which was nothing more than a similar collection of citizens, should not. 131
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Jay dismissed the argument that the dignity of states would be degraded by their
being sued. His response was that the Constitution also contemplated suits between
states, and that if such suits were not beneath the dignity of states, suits against citizens of
other states should not be either. 132 Jay found this result consistent with the nation’s
principles of providing equality and justice for all citizens. 133
Jay was not as cavalier as Wilson or Blair in terms of dismissing the enforcement
prong. He was hesitant, like Justice Cushing, about extending the reasoning to cases
involving the federal government. In leaving open the question of whether citizens could
sue the United States in federal court (which would require the executive branch to
enforce any judgment against the United States), Jay stated:
I wish the State of society was so far improved, and the science of Government
advanced to such a degree of perfection as that the whole nation could in the
peaceable course of law, be compelled to do justice, and be sued by individual
citizens. Whether that is, or is not, now the case, ought not to be thus collaterally
and incidentally decided: I leave it a question.134
Jay’s analysis, like those of the other justices in the majority, indicated a
preference for popular sovereignty over the rationales advanced in support of traditional
sovereign immunity. Jay was unwilling to completely discount the enforcement rationale
of sovereign immunity, but at least with regard to diversity suits against states, he was
unwilling to read sovereign immunity into the constitution.
f. The Eleventh Amendment
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Taken together, the opinions of the four members of the Chisholm majority
represented a strong repudiation of traditional sovereign immunity in light of popular
sovereignty and the liberal principles upon which the Constitution was based. The
opinions were also generally devoid of much mention of the practical concern that suits
to recover debts from states might severely harm their finances. Whether because they
rejected the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the propriety of sovereign immunity (as
some later courts have claimed), 135 or because they feared the practical consequences for
their budgets (as some later scholars have claimed), 136 lawmakers wasted little time in
overturning Chisholm by amending the Constitution. The amendment stripped the
federal courts of jurisdiction over suits prosecuted against states by “Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” 137
3. Post Eleventh Amendment History to the Present
Even though, at the time of the founding, there was some difference of opinion
regarding the propriety of sovereign immunity in a nation where the people themselves
are sovereign, that difference in views seems to have receded rather quickly after the
ratification of the Eleventh Amendment. In the view of Edwin Borchard (who was
writing in 1926), “[t]he eleventh amendment...though confined to the federal courts,
restored the ancient doctrine [of sovereign immunity] to full effect, and the courts...have
accepted it as immutable....” 138 Indeed, in Hans v. Louisiana the Supreme Court
broadened the interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment to protect states from suits
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brought by their own citizens (despite the fact that the Amendment only explicitly
prohibits suits brought by citizens of different states). 139
In Hans v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court went beyond the literal text of the
Eleventh Amendment and held that the amendment barred suits brought against states by
citizens of their own state. 140 The Court ruled that a construction of the U.S. Constitution
that allowed for such suits was contrary to the clear intent of the framers as demonstrated
by the passage of the Eleventh Amendment – the intent to not subject states to suits in
federal court. 141
The Hans view of this intent to protect states from suit was upheld in a series of
decisions in the 1990s. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Court found that
Congress could not create a cause of action against the states under the mantle of its
commerce powers. 142 The Court was concerned with the federalism implications of such
a cause of action – in particular, that Congress could impede the “sovereignty” of
states. 143 In Alden v. Maine, the Court extended its holding from Seminole Tribe to bar a
congressionally created cause of action from being brought in state court. 144 The court
justified this decision by arguing that states had an essential sovereignty and dignity that
the Constitution sought to protect, and Congress would be violating that sovereignty if
could force states to answer claims for monetary damages, regardless of the court in
which such claims were brought. 145
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The Court has recognized several areas where individuals can sue states under
federal law. First, individuals can sue states for monetary damages pursuant to some
congressionally created causes of action, but only if the causes of action are, in reality,
necessary to protect against constitutional violations. 146 The Court has struck down
several causes of action in recent years for not being “congruent and proportional” to the
purported constitutional violations they were meant to prevent. 147 Next, if individuals
decide not to seek monetary relief, they can sue state officials to enjoin them from
performing activities that are contrary to federal law. 148 Although this type of action,
called an Ex Parte Young action, is seemingly broad in scope, the Court has recently
expressed stressed that it views the action as a “narrow” exception to the sovereign
immunity states normally enjoy under the U.S. Constitution. 149
In its recent sovereign immunity jurisprudence, the Supreme Court seems to have
accepted the “privilege” rationale for sovereign immunity – states, as sovereigns, are
entitled to the privilege of not having to be haled into court by private citizens without
their consent. In these majority opinions, there has been very little discussion of the
concept of popular sovereignty, and whether shielding states from suits is consistent with
a government run for the benefit of the people. Not surprisingly, this jurisprudence has
been controversial, drawing bitter dissents. In Part IV, I will attempt to reconcile this
protection of sovereign immunity with the demise of common law sovereign immunity.
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B. Immunity at Common Law
With regard to tort claims in state courts, claims fell into two categories: suits
against municipalities and suits against states themselves. At common law, early
American state courts protected both classes of defendants by way of sovereign
immunity. In the case of municipalities, many state courts followed the lead of
Massachusetts, which in the 1812 case Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester ruled that a
stagecoach owner could not sue a town unless a statute provided a cause of action. 150
Other states followed suit in providing for sovereign immunity for local governments. 151
With respect to state governments, state courts seemed to follow the lead of the Eleventh
Amendment in denying relief to individual claimants (even though the Eleventh
Amendment only appeared to apply to the federal courts). 152
This is not to say that individuals were completely without redress when they
were harmed by government actors. While the doctrine of sovereign immunity took
away direct actions against the state or federal government, individuals could still sue
individual governmental officers in tort. 153 However, this remedy was decidedly inferior
to the remedy of suing a state directly, since it would considerably more difficult to
collect from an officer who might be insolvent. One commentator characterized officer
suits as “often useless.” 154 Ironically, through the early 20th century, it was more
difficult to recover for harms caused by governments than in the United States than in
Britain, because common law sovereign immunity had stripped individuals of any right
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of recovery against the government, while the British Petition of Right had least provided
some relief. 155
In the later part of the 20th century, aided by considerable scholarly criticism, 156
state courts changed their approach toward sovereign immunity. 157 Many state courts
abolished common law doctrines of sovereign immunity that had protected states from
suit. Some of those courts used strong language in panning the doctrine. The California
Supreme Court called sovereign immunity “an anachronism, without rational basis, [that]
has existed only by the force of inertia.” 158 The chief evil of sovereign immunity,
according to the California court, was that it denied individuals the opportunity to obtain
meaningful relief. 159 Courts also rejected with disgust what they saw as the underlying
assumption of sovereign immunity – that the sovereign government can do no wrong.
They have argued that this assumption flies in the face of the very principles upon which
the American Revolution was fought – specifically, the people ridding themselves of
royal caprice. In a somewhat simplified gloss on the history of sovereign immunity, the
Colorado Supreme Court attributed sovereign immunity in its current form to the
machinations of the Tudor monarchs, particularly Henry VIII, as they attempted to wrest
power from the church. The court thunderously announced that:
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The monarchical philosophies invented to solve the marital problems of Henry
VIII are not sufficient justification for the denial of the right of recovery against
the government in today’s society. Assuming that there was sovereign immunity
of the Kings of England, our forbears won the Revolutionary War to rid
themselves of such sovereign prerogatives. 160
Not all state courts jumped on the bandwagon in panning the doctrine of
sovereign immunity as an archaic, corrupt concept. The Kansas Supreme Court, in
abolishing sovereign immunity, noted that the founders responsible for the importation of
sovereign immunity to the United States surely were not attempting to imbue our
governments with a cloak of absolutist impunity. Indeed, the court argued that “[u]nder
our form of government the legal sovereignty is in the people.” 161 But that observation
did not automatically mean that governmental immunity from suit was inappropriate.
The Kansas Court found a much more plausible reason for why sovereign immunity had
caught hold in America: “the people, in the exercise of their governmental power,
through the states, did not wish to be sued and harassed in carrying out their
governmental functions.” 162 The court nonetheless decided that judicially created
distinctions between different government functions should be eliminated and
government agencies should be liable for negligence. 163
In the second half of the 20th century, states were quick to jettison sovereign
immunity as inimical to America’s ideals of fairness and justice. In attacking sovereign
immunity, the focused their fire most heavily upon the doctrine’s privilege rationale,
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often with biting language. While arguing that they were upholding the values of the
American Revolution, few courts mentioned popular sovereignty by name. Ironically,
one state court that explicitly acknowledged popular sovereignty was one of the few
courts that found sovereign immunity to be (theoretically) compatible with that
conception of sovereignty, at least because it believed the real concerns of budgetary
constraints were sufficient to justify immunity.

IV. Reconciling the Fates of Common Law and Constitutional Immunity – the Role of
Federalism
In Nathan v. Commonwealth of Virginia, a 1781 case, the Court of Common Pleas
for Philadelphia County heard a case where an individual tried to attach the property of
the Commonwealth of Virginia in order to bring Virginia within the jurisdiction of the
court. 164 Virginia appeared in court and argued that it was not subject to the jurisdiction
of the courts of Pennsylvania because it was a separate sovereign, and no sovereign could
be forced to appear in the court of another.165 The court accepted this argument, and it
accepted the argument that “jurisdiction implies superiority,” 166 which meant that
jurisdiction would destroy the co-equal nature of sovereigns. 167 The court went further in
discussing the sovereignty of the King of England. The court asserted that he was
“independent of all, and subject to no one but God....No compulsory action can be
brought against him, even in his own courts.” 168 Thus, the court was entirely willing to
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apply traditional concepts of sovereign immunity to the states under the Articles of
Confederation. The court seemed to be treating the state with the full respect due a
sovereign, but the context of the case is critical – since the case was in Pennsylvania
court, Virginia was a co-equal sovereign. Even if sovereignty resided in the people, it
was still necessary for the American states to be treated as co-equals when dealing with
other governments, and the shorthand for this type of treatment was that they should be
treated like “sovereigns.” Even James Wilson, one of the most ardent critics of sovereign
immunity, saw the need for America’s governments to be treated as equals when dealing
with other governments. 169 This customary respect included not exercising jurisdiction
over the other country, for in that context jurisdiction would imply coercive superiority.
In a federal system like that of the United States, jurisdiction can raise issues of
the proper relationship between governments and citizens and between distinct
governments. While the concept of popular sovereignty might pose problems for states
seeking to exercise sovereign immunity vis à vis their citizens, it is less problematic in
terms of justifying the rights of states to be free from interference and domination at the
hands of other governments.
Since the passage of the Eleventh Amendment, the Supreme Court has
consistently used the Constitution to protect states from suit. In doing so, one of its
principal concerns has been the federalism problem raised by forcing states to answer
lawsuits brought under federal law. This federalism concern is different from the typical
sovereign immunity issue of whether a government should have to answer a private
citizen in court – instead, the concern is whether the federal government (i.e. one
“sovereign”) can force a state (another “sovereign”) to do so against its will. In other
169
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words, this special protection of states might be thought of less in terms of whether the
people or their government is sovereign, but whether a government chosen according to
principles of popular sovereignty is still entitled to the respect of foreign governments,
notwithstanding the fact that it cannot be considered the “sovereign” in domestic affairs.
The disparity in treatment between suits for money damages and for enjoining
violations of law indicates this distinction. States are obviously not complete sovereigns,
but are sovereign only in those matters over which they retain power. 170 The federal
government is sovereign, but only over those limited areas where they have been given
power. 171 When the federal government forces states to comply with valid federal laws,
it is acting within a sphere where it is sovereign and the state is not. However, when it
interferes with the ability of states to collect and dispense with revenue, then arguably it
is invading the traditional right of the states to control their finances.
Admittedly, the analogy to relations between foreign governments is imperfect.
For one thing, the congressionally-created causes of action that the Court has struck down
were passed pursuant to the powers granted to Congress (namely, its power over
interstate and Indian commerce), and so those areas could be considered areas within the
sovereign control of Congress. Moreover, forcing states to answer lawsuits for injunctive
relief still impacts public finances, which would arguably invade the domestic sphere of
the states. 172 Nonetheless, there is at least some conceptual room for a distinction
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between states acting as sovereign governments and states acting as bodies subordinate to
federal law. 173

V. Conclusion
In a federalist nation with dual governments, defenders of popular sovereignty
have argued that since sovereignty resides with the people, each government should
honor its obligations to its citizens. These arguments were made by some of the founders
during the ratification debates and in Chisholm v. Georgia on the issue of whether
individuals should be able to sue states in federal court, and similar arguments were
present in the many state court opinions of the mid- to late-20th century that abolished
common law sovereign immunity in tort. These arguments have attacked two rationales
offered to support sovereign immunity – the rationale that “sovereign” governments were
entitled to the privileges afforded English monarchs, and the rationale that it was
logically impossible to enforce a judgment against the government itself. In contrast, the
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current Supreme Court has refused to force states into court to make good on external
obligations imposed by the federal government. These divergent results might be best
understood by characterizing the sovereignty protected by the Supreme Court as the
freedom from interference by foreign governments, rather than freedom from making
good on the harms done to citizens. Such an accommodation acknowledges the problems
posed by sovereign immunity to a government based upon popular sovereignty, but
recognizes that even when the people are sovereign, governments must be able to interact
with one another in a functional manner.

VI. Postscript – When Should Realistic Fears About the Impact of Judgments Override
Principles of Accountability to the People?
In a number of disputes over the propriety of sovereign immunity in America,
courts and commentators have engaged in a debate that has been largely at the theoretical
level of whether sovereign immunity is consistent with American ideals of popular
sovereignty. This type of debate can leave analysts speculating about whether more
practical motives are at work behind the high-minded debate. At least in the context of
the ratification debates, several scholars have concluded that such underlying motives
were likely significant. However, not every debate participant has ignored practical
reality. The Kansas Supreme Court and Brutus were both open about the fact that
unfettered liability might spell disaster for states, even if immunity were inconsistent with
the liberal ideal of popular sovereignty. Is this argument a legitimate one to make in
support of a doctrine contrary to the ideals of American democracy?
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During the ratification debates, and in Chisholm, Wilson certainly believed not.
First, he argued that fiscal concerns were subordinate to the weightier issue of whether
the state was of good moral character. 174 In so doing, he implied that moral character has
no price tag – there is no cost to the state dear enough to justify the betrayal of a natural
duty. 175 Wilson acknowledged that the state sometimes had to take actions that
unavoidably harmed others, 176 but he spoke of refusing to honor debts as “tyranny” 177 –
perhaps indicating a fear on his part that debt repudiation might occur as a result of less
than lofty motives.
His position, however, may have been extreme in this regard. It is one thing to
exalt the principle of government accountability, but it is yet another to sacrifice an entire
government to that principle. If governments had failed, that could mean the end of
popular sovereignty as a viable concept as well. Perhaps by saving the governments, the
fiction of sovereign immunity was able to save popular sovereignty. It is impossible to
know, of course, whether states would have indeed shut down if they had been
commanded to pay war debts by the courts. The prospect of states being hamstrung by
their debts, though, was evidently a significant fear for many framers. When dealing
with the matter of the solvency of the government, perhaps principle rightly gave way to
practicality.
This line of reasoning has two problems. The first problem, visible as a result of
historical hindsight, is that the doctrine justified by exigent circumstances lasted long
after the exigencies had vanished. By the 20th century, states had grown to such an
174
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extent, and had access to sufficient insurance, that absolute immunity from suit was no
longer necessary to protect them from insolvency. The judiciary was still very timid in
abolishing common law sovereign immunity, although when it finally did so it used bold
language.
The second problem is one of principle. Once a government invokes doctrines
inimical to its founding principles in order to justify its own survival, its legitimacy is
certainly jeopardized. It is one thing for a legislature to constrain suits against the state,
for legislative action may be presumed sanctioned by the people; it is quite another for
the judiciary to create such a constraint. Governments should not lightly subvert the
principles upon which they are founded, and invoking the right of the sovereign to
prevent individuals from recovering for their injuries certainly seems inconsistent with
the idea that the only legitimate source of power is the people themselves.
Furthermore, if governments are to be shielded from suit, it seems more consistent
with popular sovereignty for the people themselves, or at least their representatives, to
sanction such protection. At least statutory sovereign immunity has the implicit approval
of the people, and can be seen more easily as a legitimate accommodation to the practical
realities of self-governance, rather than a government being insulated from the
consequences of its actions.
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